The typed client of the account server's routes (openapi.yaml), signed in with this session: it borrows the core's access token (and has the core refresh it on a 401). For the routes the core doesn't wrap; JSON is the server's (snake_case).
The discovery document of the server this account is on.
The erase date while the account is scheduled for deletion (SPEC.md §23), else null.
this account's public key fingerprint (to compare out of band)
True while the servers can't be reached and this account works from the offline cache.
Where this server's share links point (config.share, else ${config.web}/s), or null.
Confirms an accepted member (SPEC §12) and grants vaults. The core fetches and verifies the member's
keys. Takes a member from account.auth.listMembers (snake_case) or account.core.orgMembers.
Creates a service account in an org; token (shown once) is what CI uses.
Creates a share link (SPEC.md §22). The key stays in the link's fragment.
Creates a vault (in an org with orgId) and uploads it empty.
Whether this device can sign in to email without being given the Secret Key.
Imports an open local vault as a new account vault (re-keyed with a fresh vault key). Throws
VaultUploadError (holding the new vault) when it was created but the first upload failed.
Issues another secret (token) for a service account.
This account's share links, newest first, with where each came from when this account can read that.
Every vault this account can open, with names decrypted (offline: the cached list).
Signs in (OPAQUE) and unlocks. totp is a code or a prompt asked again after a wrong code.
Signs out (and with forgetDevice drops the kept Secret Key and device id).
Locks and signs out with a keepalive request, for pagehide.
The signed-in user's profile: plan, orgs, two-step status, and the keyset's kdf parameters and
signature-checked publicKeys (with fingerprint). Keys that don't verify are invalid_public_keys.
Called when the server ends this session (token reused, expired, signed out elsewhere, deletion).
Downloads and opens a vault (offline: the cached copy).
Parks this session (switching accounts) so resumeSession can come back to it without signing in.
Back online after working offline: syncs and returns the vault list and the vaults no longer listed.
Completes an approved account reset (SPEC.md §18): new password and Secret Key; signs in.
Creates an account. Returns the Secret Key to show once (Emergency Kit). Signs in and unlocks.
Removes a member and rotates the keys of the vaults they could read.
Unlocks from sealUnlocked's output. Throws decryption_failed for another key, user or server.
Removes access and rotates the vault key so the removed principals can't read new versions. A rotation
left pending on the vault by this account (another device, or this one, stopped before activating) is
finished first; one this account holds no key for is rotation_pending (409) until it is activated or,
after 24 hours, replaced.
Rotates the vault key (optionally removing principals), with revoke's pending-rotation rules.
Seals the unlocked keyset under key (AES-GCM, random IV, bound to this issuer and user), so a page
can unlock again after a reload with resumeUnlocked instead of the master password. Pass a
non-extractable AES-GCM key and keep the result apart from it.
The Secret Key this device keeps for the signed-in account, to show again; null when it keeps none.
Grants a user (by email or principal) access to a vault; returns their principal and fingerprint. When
the user was shown the grantee's fingerprint to compare first, use shareWithKeys.
Shares a vault to the keys the user confirmed: keys are the grantee's public keys whose fingerprint
was shown (e.g. trustedPublicKeys(await account.auth.lookupUser(email))). The core fetches the
grantee's keys again and, if they are no longer keys (changed since they were shown), seals nothing
and fails with invalid_public_keys.
Server events: vault changes, access changes (the vault list is refetched) and the end of the session. Returns a handle to close.
Unlocks a signed-in (resumed) session with the master password. With offline, an unreachable server
falls back to the wrapped keyset cached at the last sign-in or unlock.
OptionalsecretKey: stringThe verified public keys of a user or service account (invalid_public_keys if the signature fails).
A one-time link that signs the web app in as this account (SPEC.md §16).
Optionalnext: stringStaticconnectDiscovers the server and loads a stored session, if any (signed in but locked). With offline, an
unreachable server falls back to the discovery document from the last successful connect.
StatichasWhether storage holds edits of this user's vaults not yet uploaded.
StaticsessionWhether storage holds an active, parked or no session for this user (without connecting).
The core's account handle, for everything this class doesn't wrap (orgs, devices, audit, billing…).